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Ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols call for a source that emits single photon signals,
but the sources used in typical practical realizations emit weak coherent states instead. A weak
coherent state may contain more than one photon, which poses a potential security risk. QKD
with weak coherent state signals has nevertheless been proven to be secure, but only under the
assumption that the phase of each signal is random (and completely unknown to the adversary).
Since this assumption need not be fully justified in practice, it is important to know whether phase
randomization is really a requirement for security rather than a convenient technical assumption
that makes the security proof easier. Here, we exhibit an explicit attack in which the eavesdropper
exploits knowledge of the phase of the signals, and show that this attack allows the eavesdropper
to learn every key bit in a parameter regime where a protocol using phase-randomized signals is
provably secure. Thus we demonstrate that phase randomization really does enhance the security of
QKD using weak coherent states. This result highlights the importance of a careful characterization
of the source for proofs of the security of quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
In quantum key distribution [1], two parties (Alice and
Bob) use quantum signals to establish a shared key that
can be used to encrypt and decrypt classical messages.
An eavesdropper (Eve) who collects information about
the key by interacting with the signals produces a de-
tectable disturbance; therefore Alice and Bob can detect
the eavesdropper’s activity, and they can reject the key
if they fear that the eavesdropper knows too much about
it. But if the detected disturbance is weak enough, then
Alice and Bob can use classical error correction and pri-
vacy amplification protocols to extract a shared key that
is very nearly uniformly distributed and almost certainly
private [2–5]. The security of the QKD protocol is said to
be unconditional, because the security can be proven for
any attack consistent with the laws of quantum physics,
and without any assumptions about computational hard-
ness.
Experiments have recently demonstrated the feasibil-
ity of QKD over 150 km telecom fibers [6,7], and at least
two firms are now marketing commercial QKD systems
[8]. But how secure are these systems, really? To assess
the security of practical implementations of QKD, it is
important to consider how well the actual systems match
the performance assumed in the security proofs. In par-
ticular, the signals used in typical practical realizations
of QKD are dim laser pulses, which occasionally contain
more than one photon. Multi-photon signals together
with loss in the optical fiber can threaten security, but
proofs of security for QKD using weak coherent states
have been found [9,10]. (We note that for QKD proto-
cols that use decoy states [11–14], security can be proven
even for rather strong coherent-state signals. In this pa-
per, however, we will focus on QKD with weak coherent
states.)
A key assumption in the security proofs in [9,10] (and
also in [12]) is that the phase of the quantum signal is
uniformly random. A coherent state of one mode of the
electromagnetic field can be expressed as
|α〉 = e−|α|2/2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 , (1)
where |n〉 denotes the state with photon number n. We
may write α =
√
µeiθ, where µ = |α|2 denotes the mean
photon number and eiθ is the phase of the coherent state.
To an eavesdropper with no a priori knowledge of the
phase, a signal whose phase is selected uniformly at ran-
dom is indistinguishable from the state
ρµ =
∫
2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|√µeiθ〉〈√µeiθ| = e−µ
∑
n
µn
n!
|n〉〈n| , (2)
a Poisson distributed mixture of photon number eigen-
states. Therefore, for a security analysis, we may suppose
that a source emitting weak coherent state signals is ac-
tually emitting signals in the state ρµ.
With probability p0 = e
−µ, which is close to one for
small µ, the source emits no photon; exactly one photon
is emitted with probability p1 = µe
−µ. The probability
that two or more photons are emitted is
pM = 1− e−µ (1 + µ)) ≤ 1
2
µ2 . (3)
Multiphotons can pose a security risk, but if each signal
has a random phase, pM is sufficiently small, and the loss
in the channel is not too high, then it is possible to prove
security against arbitrary eavesdropping attacks [9,10].
However, no known security proof applies if the eaves-
dropper has some a priori knowledge about the phase of
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the signal states. Conceivably, such phase information
might be accessible in realistic implementations of QKD.
For example, in a “plug-and-play” scheme, a strong signal
is sent from Bob to Alice, who attenuates and modulates
the signal before returning it to Bob; in unidirectional
schemes as well, strong ancillary pulses are sometimes
used to monitor the channel. The phase of a strong pulse
is accurately measurable in principle, and could be corre-
lated with the phase of the key-generating pulse. Even if
strong pulses are not used, the phase coherence of a real-
istic source might be maintained during the emission of
many weak signals, allowing the phase to be determined
accurately. Therefore, it is important to investigate the
security of QKD under the assumption that the eaves-
dropper knows something about the phase of the signals.
Can she exploit this knowledge to improve the effective-
ness of her attack?
Our conclusion is that she can. We will compare the se-
curity of two implementations of the BB84 QKD protocol
[1], using two different sources. Source R (for random)
emits phase randomized weak coherent states with mean
photon number µ. Source P (for phase) emits weak co-
herent states with the same mean photon number µ, but
such that each signal has a definite phase (e.g., eiθ = 1)
that is known by the eavesdropper. We will show that
there is a range for the bit error rate δ observed in the
protocol (.146 < δ < .189) such that, for sufficiently
small µ, BB84 using source R is secure, but BB84 using
source P is not. Specifically, using source R, key bits
can be generated at a positive asymptotic rate such that,
with high probability, the key is exponentially close to
uniformly random and the eavesdropper’s knowledge of
the key is exponentially small. But if source P is used,
for the same bit error rate and signal strength, the eaves-
dropper has perfect knowledge of every key bit.
Briefly, our argument goes as follows: We will describe
an intercept/resend attack on BB84 using a measurement
that we call unambiguous key discrimination. By exploit-
ing her knowledge of the phase of the signals emitted by
source P, Eve performs a POVM with three outcomes:
0, 1, and DK (don’t know). The DK outcome is incon-
clusive, but if either of the other outcomes occurs, then
Eve knows with certainty the key bit (0 or 1) encoded
in the BB84 signal emitted by the source, though she
does not gain any information about which of the two
possible BB84 states compatible with that key bit was
emitted. Eve blocks the signals when her outcome is
DK, but if the outcome is conclusive she sends on to Bob
a uniform coherent superposition of the two compatible
BB84 states. This procedure generates a bit error rate
δ = 1
2
− 1
2
√
2
≈ .146. Evidently, Eve has the same key
information as Alice and Bob, so that, if she also knows
their protocol for error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion, she will have perfect knowledge of every bit of the
final key. On the other hand, if source R is used instead,
by combining techniques in [10] with the two-way pri-
vacy amplification protocol in [15], we will show that for
the same bit error rate, secure key can be extracted at
a nonzero rate for µ < .0240. Our essential observation
is that while a fraction O(µ2) of all signals are insecure
when source R is used, this fraction increases to O(µ)
when source P is used instead. Thus, QKD using source
P is intrinsically more vulnerable to eavesdropping.
In the rest of this paper, we explain our argument in
more detail. In the ideal (polarization-based) BB84 pro-
tocol, each signal is a single photon, and the key informa-
tion is carried by the photon’s polarization, a qubit. We
consider two conjugate orthonormal bases for this qubit:
the z basis {|0〉, |1〉} and the x basis {|+〉, |−〉}, where
|±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉) /√2. The source emits one of these four
states, chosen equiprobably. For signals sent in the z ba-
sis, 0 and 1 are the key bits. For signals sent in the x
basis, + indicates the key bit 0 and − indicates 1.
If the source actually emits weak coherent states, then
the BB84 signals become
|0˜〉 = e−µ/2 (|vac〉+ α|0〉+ . . .) ,
|1˜〉 = e−µ/2 (|vac〉+ α|1〉+ . . .) ,
|+˜〉 = e−µ/2 (|vac〉+ α|+〉+ . . .) ,
|−˜〉 = e−µ/2 (|vac〉+ α|−〉+ . . .) , (4)
where |vac〉 denotes the vacuum (no-photon) state, and
the ellipsis indicates the multiphoton contribution. Let
us suppose that the phase of each signal is eiθ = 1, so that
α =
√
µ is real and positive, We assume that α is small, so
that multiphotons are unlikely. Ignoring the small multi-
photon component, the signals reside in a qutrit Hilbert
space with basis {|vac〉, |0〉, |1〉}; expanded in this basis,
they may be re-expressed as
|0˜〉 = e−µ/2 (1, α, 0) ,
|+˜〉 = e−µ/2
(
1,
α√
2
,
α√
2
)
,
|1˜〉 = e−µ/2 (1, 0, α) ,
|−˜〉 = e−µ/2
(
1,
α√
2
,− α√
2
)
. (5)
We note that the four BB84 states span a plane in the
Bloch sphere that can be chosen arbitrarily; thus we
could replace the x basis states by the rotated states
|±〉ϕ =
(
eiϕ|0〉 ± e−iϕ|1〉) /√2. In the ideal protocol the
phase eiϕ has no significance, but for weak coherent sig-
nals that are not phase randomized, the effectiveness of
Eve’s attack can depend on eiϕ. In eq. (5) we have cho-
sen eiϕ = 1, because this choice minimizes Eve’s ability
to discern the value of the key bit.
The multiphoton component of the state can help Eve,
but to keep our analysis simple, we will consider an at-
tack on the source P that makes no use of the multi-
photons. Eve performs an orthogonal measurement that
distinguishes photon number less than two from photon
number greater than or equal to two, and she discards
the state if the latter outcome is found. (We will be
interested in values of µ that are sufficiently small that
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Eve would not benefit very much from taking advantage
of the multiphotons.) Thus the states she retains are
qutrits. She then performs a three-outcome POVM (un-
ambiguous key distribution) to identify the key bit. The
two conclusive outcomes of the POVM are projections
onto the states:
|0⊥〉 = Nµ,0
(
−α− α√
2
, 1 +
1√
2
,
1√
2
)
,
|1⊥〉 = Nµ,1
(
− α√
2
, 1 +
1√
2
,
1√
2
)
, (6)
where Nµ,0, Nµ,1 are normalization factors such that
N−2µ,0 = (2 +
√
2)
[
1 +
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)
µ
]
,
N−2µ,1 = (2 +
√
2)
[
1 +
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
2
)
µ
]
.
(7)
The vector |0⊥〉 is orthogonal to both of the two states
|0˜〉 and |+˜〉 that indicate the key bit 0. Hence, if this
outcome is found, Eve knows for sure that the key bit
could not be 0 and so must be 1. Similarly, the vector
|1⊥〉 is orthogonal to both of the states |1˜〉 and |−˜〉 that
indicate the key bit 1.
The vectors |0⊥〉 and |1⊥〉 are nearly parallel for small
α. To ensure that all three POVM elements are positive,
we may choose
E0 =
1
2
|1⊥〉〈1⊥| , E1 = 1
2
|0⊥〉〈0⊥| ,
EDK = I − E0 − E1 . (8)
(For small positive µ, the strength of the conclusive
POVM elements can be pushed up slightly, but this is
a small effect that we ignore.) Thus we find the prob-
ability pD of a conclusive outcome (taking into account
that Eve might detect multiphotons and reject the state)
〈0˜|E0|0˜〉 = 〈+˜|E0|+˜〉
=
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
2
)
µe−µ
[
1 +
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)
µ
]−1
(9)
if the key bit is 0, and
〈1˜|E1|1˜〉 = 〈−˜|E1|−˜〉
=
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
2
)
µe−µ
[
1 +
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
2
)
µ
]−1
(10)
if the key bit is 1. We note that the conclusive outcome is
slightly more likely when the key bit is 1. This asymme-
try can be traced to the property that the overlap |〈+˜|0˜〉|
of the two signals that indicate the key bit 0 is slightly
larger than the overlap |〈−˜|1˜〉| of the two signals that
indicate the key bit 1. (For other choices of the phase
eiϕ that determines the plane in the Bloch sphere occu-
pied by the BB84 signals, the asymmetry is substantially
larger.) In any case, for either value of the key bit, the
probability of a conclusive outcome obeys
pD ≥ (.146)µe−µ [1 + (.854)µ]−1 . (11)
Now pD is the probability that Eve resends the sig-
nal to Bob, and therefore it is the probability that Bob
detects a signal, if his detector is perfectly efficient. If
there were no interference by the eavesdropper (and no
loss in the quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob),
all non-vacuum signals would be detected, and then
pD = 1− e−µ = µ+O(µ2). If Eve uses the unambiguous
key discrimination POVM, then of course pD vanishes in
the limit µ→ 0, but what is noteworthy (and crucial for
our argument) is that pD vanishes linearly with µ. Thus
for µ small, a fraction η ≈ .146 of order one of all the
non-vacuum signals sent by Alice are received by Bob.
Having characterized Eve’s attack when source P is
used, we now consider the security analysis for source R,
following [10]. We suppose that the source emits a mul-
tiphoton signal with probability pM , that Bob detects a
fraction pD of all the signals sent by Alice, and that Eve’s
attack is unrestricted. Of the signals that are received,
the fraction that were emitted as multiphotons is no more
than ∆ = pM/pD; the rest are single photon signals.
We can prove security as in [5], by relating the BB84
protocol to a protocol is which the key is generated by
measuring noisy entangled pairs shared by Alice and Bob.
Private key can be extracted at a positive asymptotic rate
if it is possible to distill high fidelity entanglement from
the noisy entanglement. Entanglement distillation will
succeed if the noisy entangled pairs have a bit error rate
and a phase error rate that are both sufficiently small.
The bit error rate δ is inferred directly from the verifica-
tion test in the BB84 protocol; the phase error rate δp is
also inferred, but by a less direct argument.
If the source and detector used in the protocol were
perfect, then a symmetry argument would suffice to show
δ = δp. This symmetry is broken if the equipment is im-
perfect, but it is still possible to bound the difference
between the two error rates using an appropriate charac-
terization of the imperfections. For the case where Bob
has a perfect detector, but Alice’s source sometimes emit
multiphotons, it can be shown that
|δp − δ| < ∆/2 , (12)
where ∆ is the fraction of all the detected signals that
were emitted as multiphotons. (The upper bound ∆
found in [10] has been improved to ∆/2 in [16].)
Now, the security proof in [5], which relates one-way
privacy amplification to one-way entanglement distilla-
tion using quantum error-correcting codes, does not ap-
ply for a bit error rate above δ = .110. But security
of BB84 was established in [15] for a bit error rate as
high as .189, by relating two-way privacy amplification
to entanglement distillation with two-way communica-
tion between Alice and Bob. The original argument in
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[15] assumed a perfect source and detector. But the two-
way entanglement distillation succeeds if both δ and δp
are below .189; therefore the argument can be applied to
a protocol with imperfect equipment if there is a strong
enough bound on |δ − δp|.
If the bit error rate δ is .146, then the two-way BB84
protocol is secure for |δ − δp| < .189− .146 = .043. And
for a source that emits phase-randomized coherent states,
it suffices that ∆ < .086, where
∆ =
pM
pD
≤
(
1
2
µ2
(.146)µe−µ [1 + (.854)µ]−1
)
= (3.42)µeµ [1 + (.854)µ] . (13)
Thus ∆ < .086, and the protocol is provably secure, for
µ < .0240. The security proof still applies if Bob’s de-
tector, rather than being perfectly efficient, has an ef-
ficiency that is independent of the basis in which the
detector measures, where whether the detector fires is
decided randomly, uninfluenced by the eavesdropper.
We have shown, therefore, that the BB84 QKD proto-
col is less secure using the phase-coherent source P than
using the phase-randomized source R. Eve can exploit
her knowledge of the phase of the signals emitted by the
source P to implement a POVM that, when its outcome
is conclusive, unambiguously identifies the key bit. But
for the same bit error rate δ ≈ .146, signal strength µ
(< .0240), and signal detection rate pD ≈ .146µ, if the
signals have random phases then Alice and Bob can gen-
erate a final key about which Eve has negligible knowl-
edge.
This observation raises many questions. Can realis-
tic sources be engineered so that each signal has a phase
that the eavesdropper is unable to guess? Can “plug-and-
play” systems, and other systems that use strong ancil-
lary pulses, be protected from phase-coherent attacks?
Can strong security results be proven if the phase is gov-
erned, not by a uniform probability distribution, but by a
distribution that is sufficiently broad? Finally, and most
urgently, if Eve knows the phase of every signal emitted
by the source in a BB84 protocol, is there any positive
bit error rate δ such that provably secure key can be
generated at a positive asymptotic rate?
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